The role of language in emotion: predictions from psychological constructionism by Kristen A. Lindquist et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 14 April 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00444
Edited by:
Cornelia Herbert,
University Clinic for Psychiatry and
Psychotherapy, Tuebingen, Germany
Reviewed by:
Frederic Isel,
Sorbonne Paris Cité – Paris Descartes
University, France
Anna Hatzidaki,
University of Athens, Greece
Marta Ghio,
Heinrich-Heine-Universität,
Düsseldorf, Germany
*Correspondence:
Kristen A. Lindquist,
Carolina Affective Science Laboratory,
Department of Psychology, University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
NC 27599, USA
kristen.lindquist@unc.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Language Sciences, a section of the
journal Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 01 October 2014
Accepted: 29 March 2015
Published: 14 April 2015
Citation:
Lindquist KA, MacCormack JK and
Shablack H (2015) The role of
language in emotion: predictions from
psychological constructionism.
Front. Psychol. 6:444.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00444
The role of language in emotion:
predictions from psychological
constructionism
Kristen A. Lindquist*, Jennifer K. MacCormack and Holly Shablack
Carolina Affective Science Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
Common sense suggests that emotions are physical types that have little to do with
the words we use to label them. Yet recent psychological constructionist accounts
reveal that language is a fundamental element in emotion that is constitutive of both
emotion experiences and perceptions. According to the psychological constructionist
Conceptual Act Theory (CAT), an instance of emotion occurs when information from
one’s body or other people’s bodies is made meaningful in light of the present situation
using concept knowledge about emotion. The CAT suggests that language plays a
role in emotion because language supports the conceptual knowledge used to make
meaning of sensations from the body and world in a given context. In the present
paper, we review evidence from developmental and cognitive science to reveal that
language scaffolds concept knowledge in humans, helping humans to acquire abstract
concepts such as emotion categories across the lifespan. Critically, language later helps
individuals use concepts to make meaning of on-going sensory perceptions. Building
on this evidence, we outline predictions from a psychological constructionist model
of emotion in which language serves as the “glue” for emotion concept knowledge,
binding concepts to embodied experiences and in turn shaping the ongoing processing
of sensory information from the body and world to create emotional experiences and
perceptions.
Keywords: language, emotion, psychological constructionism, concept acquisition, emotional development,
concept knowledge, abstract concepts
Language and Emotion
Common sense suggests that language has naught to dowith emotion. Surely, the things that people
say aﬀect our emotions, and we can describe our emotions (or the emotions we see in others) with
words after the fact. However, it is typically assumed that this is the extent of the relationship
between language and emotion. Many contemporary psychological models of emotion agree with
this common sense perspective. In these views, emotions are physical types that are essentially dis-
tinct from linguistic or conceptual processing (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011; Panksepp, 2011; Shariﬀ
and Tracy, 2011; Fontaine et al., 2013). Yet growing psychological research suggests that the role of
language may run deeper in emotions than either laypeople or researchers previously thought.
In this paper, we introduce a psychological constructionist model of emotion that explains the
mechanisms by which language plays a fundamental role in emotion. We begin our article by ﬁrst
providing a brief primer on the psychological constructionist approach we take in our own work
called the Conceptual Act Theory (CAT; cf., Barrett, 2006b). We outline the CAT’s predictions for
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the role of language in emotion and discuss early evidence that
language does indeed play a role in emotion. To understand the
ultimate and proximate mechanisms by which language plays a
role in emotion, we next explore evidence from developmental
and cognitive science, demonstrating that language helps humans
acquire and then use concept knowledge to make meaning of
their experiences and perceptions. We close by exploring the
implications of language’s role in emotion concept acquisition
and use for emotional experiences and perceptions.
Psychological Construction and the
Conceptual Act Theory
The idea that language goes beyond describing emotion after the
fact is consistent with psychological constructionist theories of
emotion. Psychological construction is a family of theories that
conceives of emotions as psychological “compounds” resulting
from the combination of more basic psychological “elements”
that are not themselves speciﬁc to emotions (Russell, 2003;
Barrett, 2006b, 2013; Clore and Ortony, 2008, 2013; Cunningham
et al., 2013; Lindquist, 2013; see Gendron and Barrett, 2009 for
a historical account of psychological constructionist views). All
constructionist theories of emotion predict that psychological
compounds such as anger, disgust, fear, etc. emerge when more
basic psychological elements such as representations of the body,
exteroceptive sensations (e.g., visual sensations; auditory sensa-
tions) and concept knowledge about emotion categories combine.
Just as chemical compounds (e.g., NaCl) emerge frommore basic
elements and possess attributes that their constitutive elements
do not—NaCl (sodium chloride, or commonly, table salt) has
properties that are not reducible to either sodium, which is a
member of the alkali metal family, or chlorine, which is a type
of halogenic gas—psychological compounds such as emotions
are more than the sum of representations of the body, extero-
ceptive sensations, and concept knowledge. Most psychological
constructionist views agree that a person experiences an emotion
when concept knowledge (e.g., knowledge about “fear”) and exte-
roceptive sensations (e.g., the sights and sounds of being in a dark
alley) are used to make meaning of body states (e.g., a beating
heart, sweaty palms, and feelings of startle) in a given instance.
A person sees someone else as emotional when concept knowl-
edge (e.g., knowledge about “fear”) and exteroceptive sensations
(e.g., the sights and sounds of riding a roller coaster) are used to
makemeaning of someone else’s aﬀective bodily and facial muscle
movements (e.g., a person’s wide eyes, gaping mouth, and white
knuckles). Our own psychological constructionist approach, the
CAT (Barrett, 2006a, 2009, 2012; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011;
Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist, 2013) speciﬁcally predicts
a role for language in this process, insofar as language supports
the acquisition and use of concept knowledge (e.g., the concept of
“fear”) that is used to make sensations meaningful as emotions.
Basic Elements of the Mind
According to the CAT (CAT; cf., Barrett, 2006a; Lindquist, 2013),
the basic elements that contribute to emotions (and other men-
tal states) are representations of sensations from inside the body
(known as aﬀect), representations of sensations from outside the
body (known as exteroceptive sensations), and concept knowl-
edge used to make those sensations meaningful in context (cf.,
Barrett, 2009; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012;
Lindquist, 2013). Aﬀect is a representation of the body’s ever-
changing internal state, which can be experienced as having some
degree of valence and arousal or “activation” (Cacioppo et al.,
2000; Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006b; Kober et al., 2008; Mauss and
Robinson, 2009; Lindquist et al., 2012; Clore and Ortony, 2013;
Cunningham et al., 2013). Aﬀect is often described as a homeo-
static barometer that allows an organism to understand whether
objects in the world are good for it, bad for it, approachable
or avoidable (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Aﬀect is a com-
bination of interoceptive information from the internal milieu
that represents activity in the smooth muscles, skeletal muscles,
peripheral nervous system, and neurochemical/hormonal system
(Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Lindquist, 2013). Aﬀect thus
provides an internal representation of the meaning of objects in
the world and can serve as a “common currency” for comparing
the meaning of otherwise diverse stimuli and events (Cabanac,
2002).
By contrast, exteroceptive sensations provide an organism
with a representation of information from the external world
outside of the body (e.g., vision, audition, taste, olfaction, and
proprioception; Barrett, 2009; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; cf.,
Lindquist et al., 2012). Exteroceptive sensations contribute to per-
ceptions of emotions in other people (via vision, audition, and
perhaps even tactile or olfactory sensations) but are also often the
sources of shifts in core aﬀect (e.g., visual sensations of a dark,
long, squiggly shape in the middle of the path ahead of you in the
woods) that contribute to one’s experiences of emotions in his or
her own body and provide information about the physical context
that is used to help disambiguate the meaning of interoceptive
sensations.
Importantly, the CAT predicts that both aﬀect and extero-
ceptive sensations are made meaningful as instances of spe-
ciﬁc emotional experiences or perceptions using concept knowl-
edge about emotion categories (Barrett, 2006a, 2009, 2014;
Lindquist, 2013; also see Russell, 2003; Clore and Ortony, 2013;
Cunningham et al., 2013 for other psychological construci-
tonist views). Concept knowledge refers to the rich cache of
instances that populate what someone “knows” about diﬀer-
ent categories. For instance, people may know that the cate-
gory of fear involves a beating heart, sweaty palms, a knot in
the stomach, an urge to ﬂee, and threatening contexts related
to various objects (e.g., snakes, bears, cliﬀs, intruders, etc.).
Notably, people also know lots of other information about fear,
even if it’s not stereotypical of fear, and this information may
vary ideographically—for instance, one person might know that
fear can involve attacking someone else; another person might
know that fear can involve smiling. Still other people might
know that fear can variably involve clowns, global warming,
public humiliation, and existential concerns. Rather than con-
sisting of a number of prototypes for certain emotions, con-
cept knowledge about emotion is thus thought to consist of
populations of instances (cf., Barrett, 2012) that have been
acquired via a combination of instrumental learning via other
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individuals (i.e., “semantic knowledge”) and personal experience
(i.e., “episodic knowledge”; see discussion in Vigliocco et al.,
2009).
Once acquired, concept knowledge serves as a form of a
priori information to shape predictions about new interocep-
tive and exteroceptive sensations, helping the brain understand
the meaning of sensations and act on them (Bar, 2007; Barrett,
2009, 2014; Clark, 2013). In the case of emotion, this means that
concept knowledge is used to help make otherwise vague and
potentially ambiguous sensations from inside the body (aﬀect)
and outside the body (exteroceptive sensations) meaningful as
instances of speciﬁc emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, pride,
joy, schadenfreude, what have you). The resulting emotion is
thus an emergent state that is at once aﬀective and conceptual
(cf., Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a). We refer to the process of
using knowledge to make meaning of sensations as situated con-
ceptualization, because the concept knowledge accessed to make
meaning of sensations is highly situated and dependent on the
present context. Situated conceptualization is a relatively auto-
matic1 process (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Barrett, 2014)
and operates in a probabilistic manner (Barrett et al., 2007b;
Clark, 2013), making predictions about the meaning of sensa-
tions (e.g., a beating heart, sweaty palms) given the features of
the present context (e.g., giving a speech), prior experiences of
other contexts in which similar sensations have occurred (e.g.,
past experiences of giving speeches vs. past experiences of watch-
ing scary movies vs. experiences of standing atop a tall balcony),
and culturally relative knowledge about the types of experiences
that involve certain sensations (e.g., knowledge about fear vs.
excitement).
Importantly, the CAT predicts that the aforementioned ele-
ments are domain-general elements of the mind and are not spe-
ciﬁc to the category of mental states called “emotions” (Barrett,
2009; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013;
Lindquist, 2013). In essence, the CAT does not see “emotions”
as states that are fundamentally distinct from “cognitions” or
“perceptions” (cf., Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; e.g., Oosterwijk
et al., 2012); all are constructed from the same basic elements
and are nominal kind categories that exist because members of
a culture agree that they share certain features (e.g., in English,
“emotions” are typically thought to involve relatively greater
involvement of the body than “thoughts,” even if body states are
in fact constitutive of both kinds of mental states; e.g., Oosterwijk
et al., 2012). The agreement betweenmembers of a culture imbues
emotions with social reality—they are real even if the speciﬁc cat-
egories (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, sadness, schadenfreude, pride,
excitement, awe, etc.) are not inborn categories given by the
structure of the nervous system (cf., Barrett, 2012). In this sense,
the CAT and other constructionist views are quite distinct from
1Importantly, situated conceptualization does not happen because people con-
sciously categorize ambiguous feelings or situations. It is an eﬀortless and not
necessarily conscious mechanism of how the human brain works, as it masters and
makes meaning of the information and statistical regularities of experience. The
analogy is that the brain uses knowledge from prior experience to transform wave-
lengths of visible light into the perception of a speciﬁc color (Barrett, 2006b). This
process diﬀers based on the lighting present in a room and even the other colors
present in the context (see Bruner et al., 1951).
other psychological and neuroscience models of emotion, which
view emotions as domain-speciﬁc, inborn, inherited types that
are fundamentally distinct from other types of mental states
(e.g., “cognitions,” “perceptions,”), and are produced by speciﬁc
anatomically-given neural structures (i.e., emotions are natural
kind categories; e.g., Cannon, 1921; Allport, 1924; Tomkins, 1962;
Izard, 1971; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Ekman and Cordaro,
2011; see Barrett, 2006b for a review)2. In such natural kind
views, there is no role for language in the constitution of emo-
tion (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011; Panksepp, 2011; Shariﬀ and
Tracy, 2011; Fontaine et al., 2013) and the role of language in the
acquisition of emotion concepts should have no bearing on the
actual experience or perception of emotion. The predictions of
the CAT are thus quite novel in regard to emotions, even if they
are more broadly consistent with other evidence that language
generally supports the construction of “cognitive” mental states
(e.g., Boroditsky, 2011; Lupyan, 2012a,b,c).
Growing Evidence: A Role for Language in
Emotion
In contrast to the natural kind view of emotion, there is grow-
ing evidence for the CAT’s prediction that concept knowledge
supported by language plays a constitutive role in emotions. In
recent years, we have extensively reviewed the literature on lan-
guage and emotion (Barrett et al., 2007a; Lindquist and Gendron,
2013; Lindquist et al., in press a,b) documenting the various
ways in which language shapes on-going perceptions and expe-
riences of aﬀect into perceptions and experiences of emotion
(anger, disgust, fear, sadness, etc.). For instance, we have docu-
mented that impairing people’s access to the meaning of emotion
words impairs their ability to subsequently perceive emotions
on faces (Lindquist et al., 2006, 2014; Gendron et al., 2012).
Without access to the meaning of emotion words such as “dis-
gust,” vs. “anger,” vs. “fear,” vs. “sadness,” individuals perceive
posed emotional facial expressions (wrinkled noses, scowls, wide
eyes, and frowns) as merely unpleasant (Lindquist et al., 2014).
These ﬁndings suggest that access to the meaning of emotion
words (and the concepts that they represent) is an essential com-
ponent of understanding the discrete meaning of emotional facial
expressions.
Other research demonstrates that labeling one’s own unpleas-
ant feelings with emotion words causes an experience of a par-
ticular discrete emotion to occur. Individuals who are exposed
to labels for the category “fear” prior to listening to unpleasant
music are subsequently more likely to engage in behaviors typi-
cal of fear (i.e., risk aversion) than individuals who were exposed
to labels for the category “anger” or those not exposed to emo-
tion category labels at all prior to listening to unpleasant music
(Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a). Labeling one’s aﬀective state as
2The natural kind view was prevalent for the latter half of the 20th century,
but recent evidence from behavior, peripheral physiology, and neuroscience has
amassed to suggest that emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness,
etc. are not physical types with consistent and speciﬁc behavioral (Barrett, 2006b;
Mauss and Robinson, 2009) and physiological outputs (Cacioppo et al., 2000;
Barrett, 2006b; Mauss and Robinson, 2009; Quigley and Barrett, 2014) that derive
from speciﬁc circuits or regions in the brain (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., in
press a; Kassam et al., 2013; Touroutoglou et al., in press).
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an emotion also alters cardiac responses during aﬀective events.
Individuals who labeled their emotions while completing a stress-
ful mental arithmetic task showed physiological responses consis-
tent with an experience of threat (i.e., increased total peripheral
resistance or TPR; relatively reduced cardiac output), whereas
participants who did not label their emotions experienced a
physiological proﬁle more consistent with active coping (i.e.,
decreased TPR, increased cardiac output; Kassam and Mendes,
2013). These ﬁndings suggest that labeling an unpleasant state as
one type of emotional experience vs. another can shape how it is
subsequently experienced.
Neuroscience evidence also documents a critical link between
language and emotion. Growing evidence suggests that using
emotion words to label posed emotional facial expressions
reduces activity in brain regions associated with uncertainty such
as the amygdala (Lieberman et al., 2007; see Lindquist et al.,
in press b for a discussion). These ﬁndings are consistent with
the idea that emotion words help to make meaning of other-
wise ambiguous unpleasant vs. pleasant facial expressions (cf.,
Lindquist et al., in press b). Consistent with the interpretation
that language plays a routine role in creating instances of discrete
emotion perceptions and experiences, meta-analytic summaries
of the neuroimaging literature on emotion reveal that a subset
of the brain regions involved during studies of emotion percep-
tions and experiences are also involved during studies of semantic
judgments (Lindquist et al., in press b). Together, these accumu-
lating sources of evidence suggest that language may not merely
impact emotions after the fact. They instead suggest that language
plays an integral role in emotion perceptions and experiences,
shaping the nature of the emotion that is perceived or felt in the
ﬁrst place.
Finally, evidence from cross-cultural research is consistent
with the idea that language plays a constitutive role in emotion.
For instance, speakers of Herero, a dialect spoken by the remote
Himba tribe in Namibia, Africa, and American English speak-
ers perceive emotions diﬀerently on faces. When participants
were asked to freely sort images of identities making six facial
expressions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and neu-
tral) into piles, English-speakers created relatively distinct piles
for anger, disgust, fear, sad, happy and neutral faces, but Herero-
speakers did not sort in this pattern. Instead Herero-speakers
produced piles that reﬂected multiple categories of facial expres-
sions (e.g., smiling, neutral, wrinkled nose, scowling, and frown-
ing faces). Importantly, the Herero-speakers sorted similarly to
one another, suggesting that they understood the instructions
but were using diﬀerent perceptual cues (and perhaps diﬀer-
ent categories) than the English-speakers to guide their sorts
(Gendron et al., 2014).
The existing evidence thus suggests that language plays some
role in emotion, but what remains in question is the precise
mechanisms by which language does so. The CAT hypothesizes
that language helps support the acquisition and use of con-
cept knowledge about emotion, but very little work has directly
addressed this hypothesis in relation to emotion, to date. We
thus turn now to evidence from developmental and cognitive sci-
ence demonstrating that language helps individuals represent and
use concept knowledge in general, as well as concept knowledge
about emotions in particular. We use this evidence to hypothesize
about the mechanisms by which language shapes the acquisition
and subsequent use of emotion concept knowledge.
Language Supports Conceptual
Knowledge of Emotion
The CAT makes the unique prediction that language plays a role
in emotion because language helps a person to initially acquire
and then later support the representations that comprise emo-
tion concept knowledge (Lindquist, 2013; cf., Lindquist et al., in
press b). Of course, language likely plays a role in the acquisition
and use of all category knowledge (see Lupyan, 2012a,b; Borghi
and Binkofski, 2014). However, we hypothesize that language is
especially likely to be implicated in emotion because emotion
concepts (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, etc.) are embodied and abstract
representations that form populations of conceptual informa-
tion rather than concrete concepts grounded by physical types
that form prototypes for emotion category knowledge. Words
for emotion categories (e.g., “anger,” “disgust,” “fear”) thus serve
as the “glue” or “essence place-holder” (cf., Xu, 2002) that helps
bind together otherwise disparate instances of a given emotion
category3.
The idea that emotion concepts are embodied derives from
growing evidence in cognitive science that conceptual knowl-
edge is represented via sensorimotor “simulations” of prior sen-
sory experiences and actions (Glenberg and Gallese, 2012; for
review, see Kiefer and Barsalou, 2013). Traditionally, researchers
assumed that emotion concepts are structured as prototypes
(Shaver et al., 1987; Russell, 1991) or as theories about why cat-
egory members share certain features (Clore and Ortony, 1991;
Zinck and Newen, 2007). In these models, category knowledge
is represented outside the sensory modalities as amodal, sym-
bolic representations (see Barsalou, 1999). Instead, consistent
with recent theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 2009;
3 Of note, the CAT exclusivelymakes predictions for words that name speciﬁc emo-
tion categories in a given language (e.g., “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” in English and
other culturally relevant terms in other languages). We are not referring to words
that name other categories (e.g., “mother,” “murder”) that might themselves have
emotional connotations. These words, if they help construct emotions, likely do so
via less proximal mechanisms. For instance, the word “mother” might prime the
word “love,” which in turn might cause an individual to access the relevant body
states, exteroceptive sensations, and conceptual knowledge associated with that
emotion concept (for a discussion of the embodiment of emotion words see Barrett
and Lindquist, 2008). Accessing or “simulating” the relevant aﬀective and sensori-
motor concomitants of the category “love” could in turn cause a person to start to
feel an instance of love toward her mother. However, this process is clearly diﬀerent
from the process of emotion construction we are proposing in which the concep-
tual knowledge associated with the word “love” is being used in the moment make
a situated conceptualization of the pleasant aﬀect that is experienced when talking
to one’s mother on the phone, when hugging one’s mother, etc. For research on the
emotional connotations of words and implications for psycholinguistics, we point
interested readers to Altarriba et al. (1999), Kousta et al. (2011) and Borghi and
Binkofski (2014). We also point interested readers to fascinating research demon-
strating that the emotional connotations of words in second languages are not as
intense as the emotional connotations of words in ﬁrst languages (for review see
Harris et al., 2006; Opitz and Degner, 2012).
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Vigliocco et al., 2009; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014), the CAT pro-
poses that prior perceptual experiences associated with an emo-
tion category help constitute conceptual knowledge of that emo-
tion. Emotion categories are thus represented as re-enactments
of prior interoceptive sensations such as feelings (see Barrett
and Lindquist, 2008;Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013a), modality-
speciﬁc exteroceptive perceptions such as visual, auditory, olfac-
tory, and proprioceptive sensations of objects and contexts (e.g.,
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011, 2013b), and actions (e.g., punch-
ing vs. yelling vs. scowling vs. smiling in anger; Oosterwijk et al.,
2014; see Barrett and Lindquist, 2008 for a discussion). Emotion
concepts also contain more abstract, propositional information
that describes a person’s relationship to the environment (e.g.,
sadness is about loss); this information may be acquired from
one’s culture and augmented by prior experiences (i.e., represen-
tations of speciﬁc instances of loss). For example, the concept of
what it feels like to be “sad” may include previous bodily sen-
sations (e.g., feeling heavy, drained, tired; unpleasant), previous
exteroceptive sensations (i.e., sights, smells, tastes, sounds, asso-
ciated with diﬀerent physical contexts in which one was sad), and
simulations of representative instances in which loss occurred
(e.g., simulations of the context in which loss occurred at the
death of a loved one, during an insult to one’s self-esteem, loss
of a job, etc.).
Based on evidence that the bodily and exteroceptive concomi-
tants of instances of a single emotion category are highly variable
(Cacioppo et al., 2000; Barrett, 2006b; Mauss and Robinson, 2009;
Kreibig, 2010), the CAT also proposes that embodied emotion
categories are abstract—without a single category prototype to
deﬁne them (for a similar view, see Vigliocco et al., 2009; Borghi
and Binkofski, 2014). In this view, emotions are not natural kind
categories with strong perceptual regularities (Barrett, 2006a),
nor are they single prototypes that stand in as typical examples of
the rest of the category members (Barrett, 2014). Unlike concrete
categories (e.g., “apple”) that may have strong perceptual regu-
larities (e.g., apples are round, tart, crisp, red/green/yellow fruits
that grow on trees) and clear, best example prototypes (e.g., a Red
Delicious), emotion categories are thought to exist as populations
of conceptual information that might not be covered by a single
“best example” category prototype (Barrett, 2014). In this view,
there are many sensorimotor representations of “anger” that help
form conceptual knowledge about this category and there is lit-
tle perceptual regularity that makes instances obviously similar
to one another (e.g., not all instances of anger involve a scowl,
increased heart rate, punching, etc.).
Research demonstrates that situations may be key for an indi-
vidual to acquire abstract concepts, such as “anger,” “love,” “fear,”
or “pride,” that do not correspond to strong statistical regularities
in exteroceptive or interoceptive sensations. For example, when
individuals are asked to think about the abstract concepts “con-
vince” and “arithmetic,” brain regions associated with contexts in
which those concepts might be involved are activated (Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2013a). When thinking about the word “con-
vince,” brain regions associated with mentalizing and social cog-
nition are activated. By contrast, when thinking about arithmetic,
brain regions associatedwith engaging in numerical cognition are
activated. Similarly, representations of emotion concepts draw on
situations, with representations of fear involving brain networks
underlying diﬀerent types of contexts (Wilson-Mendenhall et al.,
2013b). In some instances, brain regions involved in representing
fear include those involved in social inference and mentalizing
(i.e., as might occur during social threats). By contrast, other
representations of fear involve networks underlying visuospatial
attention and action planning (i.e., as might be observed dur-
ing physical threats; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013b). Abstract
concepts can thus be thought of as reconstituted amalgama-
tions of situated experience, and these amalgamations evolve
with new experiences and new information from early life across
the lifespan (Meteyard et al., 2012). Replaying or “simulating”
the situation in which an abstract concept occurs may in part
be what enables individuals to use abstract concepts to make
future situated conceptualizations. Consistent with this hypoth-
esis, research ﬁnds that lexical access, word comprehension, and
memory are generally faster for concrete concepts than abstract
ones; however, when situational cues are provided, abstract con-
cepts become just as quickly available as concrete concepts
(Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
Critically to this paper, another key to acquiring and using
abstract concepts such as emotion concepts may be language
(cf., Barrett and Lindquist, 2008; Borghi and Binkofski, 2014).
An embodied theory of language and semantics assumes that
the brain’s linguistic system is separate from, but integrally tied
to the modality-based system that represents embodied con-
cepts (Barsalou andWiemer-Hastings, 2005; Barsalou et al., 2008;
Vigliocco et al., 2009). In the absence of strong statistical reg-
ularities based on previous perceptions of concrete objects in
the environment, abstract concepts may particularly beneﬁt from
language—that is from being associated with the phonological
form of aword (Barrett and Lindquist, 2008; Vigliocco et al., 2009;
Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). People may integrate in long-term
memory two representations from the same emotion category
(even if they involve diﬀerent bodily and exteroceptive sensa-
tions, contexts, and actions) because the label for the emotion
links them in memory (see Gelman and Markman, 1987; Borghi
and Binkofski, 2014). As foreshadowed by early researcher Hunt
(1941, p. 266), the CAT predicts that, “the. . .universal element in
any emotional situation is the use by all the subjects of a common
term of report (i.e., ‘fear’).”
The CAT of emotion thus predicts that language plays a role
in emotion because it helps individuals to initially acquire and
then use emotion concept knowledge to form situated concep-
tualizations of aﬀect (for a similar view of abstract concepts,
see Borghi and Binkofski, 2014). To date, research assessing the
CAT has focused exclusively on documenting evidence that lan-
guage plays a role in emotion experiences and perceptions at
all. However, very little research to date has addressed whether
language speciﬁcally helps individuals acquire and use words
to make situated conceptualizations of emotion across devel-
opment, which might form the ultimate mechanisms by which
language shapes emotion. Growing evidence from developmen-
tal and cognitive science demonstrates that words help infants
and adults acquire and then use concepts throughout the lifes-
pan; this evidence suggests that language is key to the acquisition
of emotion concepts. We thus turn to this literature to motivate
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predictions for how words help individuals acquire the emotion
concepts that they then use to make situated conceptualizations
about emotion.
Words Help Humans Acquire Emotion
Concepts: Lessons from Early
Development and Adult Cognition
Language and the Acquisition of Emotion
Concept Knowledge in Infants
Understanding how infants and young children use words to
learn novel concepts sheds light on how language more gen-
erally contributes to the acquisition of concept knowledge, and
by extension, concept knowledge about emotion. Developmental
accounts of concept knowledge traditionally assumed that infants
are either born with pre-existing knowledge of speciﬁc categories
(a nativist account) or learn every category de novo (an empiri-
cist account; for discussion, see Xu and Griﬃths, 2011). Similarly,
before the recent emergence of constructionist accounts of emo-
tion, many models of emotion assumed that infants were born
with the ability to experience and perceive basic emotions such
as fear, sadness, and disgust (Izard, 1978, 2007, 2011; Ekman
and Oster, 1979; Barrera and Maurer, 1981; Campos et al., 1992;
Lewis, 2000). However, growing research suggests that infants
are “rational constructivists,” born without pre-existing knowl-
edge of many categories, but possessing an intrinsic sensitivity to
statistical regularities and the ability to extrapolate to new cat-
egory instances on the basis of inductive learning (Sirois et al.,
2008; Xu and Kushnir, 2013)4. The ability to use statistical regu-
larities extracted from prior experience to categorize phenomena
and predict those phenomena’s causes, behaviors, and eﬀects is
known as probabilistic or statistical learning. Probabilistic learn-
ing continues across the lifespan and is a fundamental aspect
of human cognition (Oaksford and Chater, 2009; Carey, 2011;
Clark, 2013). We propose that this basic ability also under-
girds infants’ abilities to learn about emotion categories through
words.
From the early days of brain development in utero, infants’
brains are able to observe stimuli from inside and outside
their bodies and begin forming probabilistic a priori predic-
tions about the meaning of those stimuli (Aslin and Newport,
2012). For instance, probabilistic learning may ﬁrst exert its
inﬂuence when infants learn to categorize sounds as linguistic
vs. non-linguistic in utero. Organization of the auditory cortex
in humans is thought to occur by the 27th week of gesta-
tion (Hepper and Shahidullah, 1994) and plasticity in the audi-
tory cortex is thought to occur due to sounds penetrating the
mother’s intrauterine walls (Gerhardt and Abrams, 2000). Fetuses
exposed to particular phonemes (linguistic speech sounds) in
utero show more neural responsiveness to those phonemes after
birth than newborns that were not exposed to such phonemes as
fetuses (Partanen et al., 2013). This early sensitivity to language
4Rational constructivism is of the broader class of psychological constructionist
views of the mind (Barrett, 2009; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute,
2013).
suggests that even as neonates, infants bring with them the
ability to diﬀerentiate and make predictions about diﬀerent lin-
guistically relevant sounds. Indeed, neonates who are less than
a day old already prefer phonemes from their native language
to phonemes from a non-native language (Moon et al., 2013).
After birth, infants use the statistical properties of language
to help them diﬀerentiate between phonemes and extrapolate
rules of grammar in their native language (Saﬀran et al., 1996;
Aslin et al., 1998; Maye et al., 2002; Thiessen and Saﬀran,
2003; Kuhl, 2004; Rivera-Gaxiola et al., 2005; Gebhart et al.,
2009; Teinonen et al., 2009; Shukla et al., 2011; Krogh et al.,
2013).
Just as infants use statistical learning to diﬀerentiate words
from non-words, they also use probabilistic learning to under-
stand visual sensations in the world around them; these two
processes likely co-occur and interact (for review, see Bergelson
and Swingley, 2012). By 3–4 months of age, infants begin to
form categories for natural kinds (e.g., species categorization for
horses, zebras, tigers, cats, etc.; see Eimas andMiller, 1992; Quinn
and Eimas, 1996) and artifacts (e.g., diﬀerent furniture types such
as chairs, tables, and beds; Behl-Chadha, 1996). Some concept
knowledge for these categories may be developed on the basis
of visual statistical regularities alone (e.g., all zebras have stripes,
horses do not). Yet not all categories can be learned on the basis
of statistical regularities alone, especially abstract categories, and
so it is predicted that infants use the phonological sound of a
word as a salient cue for diﬀerentiating between sensations in the
environment. This is particularly relevant for emotion categories,
where the word “anger” for example can tie together multiple
modalities of sensorimotor experience (such as bodily sensations,
situations, or behaviors) and also can serve as “glue” for diﬀerent
instances of “anger” that are not necessarily perceptually regular
or consistent with one another (e.g., being angry at one’s com-
puter may not look or feel the same as being angry about an
insult).
Thus, by 9 months of age, infants regularly use words as cues
for understanding which objects in the world are similar vs.
distinct. For example, the presence of two distinct labels helps
infants establish a representation that two objects are in fact dis-
tinct in an object individuation task (Xu, 2002). Words seem
to be special in this regard; the presence of two diﬀerent labels
facilitates object individuation, but the presence of two distinct
tones, two distinct sounds, or two distinct emotional expressions
does not5. By contrast, when 9-month-old infants hear one label
repeated twice, they expect to see two objects that are percep-
tually similar (Dewar and Xu, 2009). By around a year of age,
infants can use the presence of words to make predictions about
the types of stimuli to expect. Twelve-month-old infants will look
for two objects when an adult uses two words as opposed to
one word to describe objects that are unseen by the infant (Xu
et al., 2005). Similarly, emotion labels may be an important cue
for helping infants and young children understand emotion cat-
egories and apply those categories to their own experiences and
observations.
5Although for evidence that 15-month old infants can use music as a cue for
acquiring categories, see Roberts and Jacob (1991).
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Importantly, for abstract concepts that do not have strong
perceptual similarities, labels also help infants learn that per-
ceptually distinct objects should be treated as members of the
same category. For instance, in 10-month-olds, linguistic labels
can override the perceptual qualities of objects, directing infants
to group together objects that do not possess strong perceptual
similarities (Plunkett et al., 2008). When infants are taught to
group cartoon creatures possessing various features (e.g., diﬀer-
ences in tail size, head size, etc.) into categories, the use of a
single label leads infants to sum across perceptual diﬀerences
within the cartoons and learn a single category that included
all the cartoon creatures. Thus, words not only inform infants
about the nature of phenomena they encounter and help them
classify what phenomena go together, but words also tell chil-
dren where to look for boundaries between categories—including
categories that might not be perceptually obvious but that are
encoded in language (Bowerman, 1988; Roberts and Jacob, 1991).
No research to date has directly examined this hypothesis with
the acquisition of emotion category knowledge in infancy, but we
predict that infants may be using words to help derive emotion
categories to describe aﬀective sensations in their own bodies and
expressions of aﬀect seen in others’ bodies.
Language and the Acquisition of Emotion
Concept Knowledge in Young Children
Once infants become verbal toddlers, their concepts become
honed through bi-directional communication with caregivers.
As infants begin producing words themselves, they have the
opportunity to receive more directed feedback from adults as to
whether their word-sensation associations map on to the word-
sensation associations of adults in their culture. Research from
computer simulations suggest that the communicative function
of language may be essential for helping humans to develop
concept knowledge that is shared with other societal members.
For instance, Steels and Belpaeme (2005) programmed artiﬁ-
cial intelligence agents in a simulation to each possess the same
capabilities for perception, categorization, and naming of colors
in the artiﬁcial environment. The color space in this artiﬁcial
environment was a set of continuous wavelengths of light with
no statistical regularities in terms of the contexts in which cer-
tain color categories appear. Each agent was furthermore pro-
grammed to experientially develop its own unique knowledge
of which sensory information corresponded to which categories
and words. In one simulation, the agents merely learned to dis-
criminate a given color from the present sensory array (all of
color space) and named the color based on their personal set
of category representations. Yet in a separate simulation, the
agents not only discriminated for themselves but also “commu-
nicated” with one another, allowing each agent to learn category
knowledge from the present social interaction in which they were
involved. In this social interaction, the ﬁrst agent (the speaker)
discriminated a given color from the present sensory array (all
of color space) and named the color based on the agent’s own
set of personal color category knowledge. The second agent (the
hearer) then had to guess which color the speaker was referring
to. If the hearer was successful, it strengthened the association
between the word used and its own personal color category
knowledge. Yet if the hearer was unsuccessful, it lessened the
association between the word used and its own color category
knowledge and also created a new association between the word
the speaker used and color category knowledge. The authors
found that although agents in the ﬁrst scenario learned to dis-
criminate between diﬀerent colors and each developed their own
set of color category knowledge from the environment, each
agent possessed completely diﬀerent color knowledge when the
simulation was over. By contrast, in the simulation involving
communication, all agents eventually possessed the same color
knowledge. Importantly, similar results persisted even when sta-
tistical regularities were introduced in terms of which colors
occurred in which contexts in the artiﬁcial environment (a sit-
uation that likely better approximates the real world). By exten-
sion, these ﬁndings suggest that children might never learn the
emotion concepts of their culture without communication with
caregivers.
In light of the importance of communication in concept acqui-
sition, it is interesting that children do not learn how to reliably
categorize facial expressions of diﬀerent emotions (e.g., “anger,”
“disgust,” “fear,” “sadness”) as distinct until they acquire and
begin to use words to describe those categories in conversation.
Although there is debate on this point, pre-linguistic infants and
toddlers younger than 2 years of age seem only able to reliably
diﬀerentiate facial expressions in terms of valence (i.e., positivity
vs. negativity; for reviews see Widen and Russell, 2008; Widen,
2013)6. Two-year-olds use the very simple emotion labels “angry”
and “happy” in daily discourse and, like infants, can reliably
diﬀerentiate faces in terms of valence. Yet 2-year-olds cannot dif-
ferentiate between more speciﬁc unpleasant emotion categories
until they start reliably using additional negative emotion terms
in daily discourse (Widen and Russell, 2008). For example, when
2-year-olds are given a set of pictures depicting ﬁve emotion
categories and are asked to perceptually match only those faces
that match an additional picture (e.g., an angry face) by plac-
ing them in a box, they place all unpleasant faces (angry, sad,
disgusted, fearful faces) in the box but leave out happy faces.
Yet as 3- and 4-year-olds begin to acquire the concepts “sad”
and “fear,” they begin to leave those faces out of the “angry”
box, demonstrating an ability to perceptually categorize unpleas-
ant faces into more speciﬁc emotions. By the age of 7, children
show adult-like perceptual categorization of most faces save dis-
gust (Widen and Russell, 2008; see Widen, 2013 for a review).
These ﬁndings suggest that as children acquire emotion words
and start using them in daily life with caregivers, they become
increasingly competent at perceiving and labeling facial expres-
sions in terms of their culture’s emotion categories. Consistent
with the idea that words help infants generalize between other-
wise perceptually distinct objects during learning, toddlers appear
to show a “language superiority eﬀect” when categorizing facial
expressions (Russell and Widen, 2002). Speciﬁcally, 2- and 3-
year-olds are better able to accurately place pictures of facial
6Evidence claiming that infants can reliably diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent facial
expression on the basis of something other than valence may be driven by diﬀer-
ences in the perceptual regularities present in stimuli that are not related to the
emotion category itself (e.g., the presence of teeth; Caron et al., 1985).
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expressions in a box labeled with a word (e.g., “anger”) as com-
pared to a box labeled with a face (e.g., an angry face), an
eﬀect that increases over early childhood. These ﬁndings sug-
gest that newly acquired emotion knowledge associated with a
word anchor may help children gloss over perceptual similari-
ties between faces that are not useful for the categorization of
facial expressions (e.g., furrowed brows in both anger and dis-
gust) and focus on perceptual diﬀerences that are diagnostic (e.g.,
a scrunched nose in disgust vs. a growl in anger). Such a link
between children’s emotion understanding and linguistic devel-
opment is also suggested in correlational studies demonstrating
that children’s advances in emotion understanding develop in
tandem with advances in language comprehension (Harris et al.,
2005).
We thus predict that emotion concept knowledge acquisition
expands as young children acquire words for speciﬁc emotions
and receive feedback on their situated conceptualizations of their
own and others’ aﬀective states through communication with
caregivers. Indeed, much evidence is consistent with the idea
that communication with parents about emotions during early
childhood is essential for children to develop complex knowledge
about the emotion categories relevant to their culture (for dis-
cussion, see Halberstadt and Lozada, 2011). The implication of
these ﬁndings is that parents’ own abilities at situated conceptual-
ization, concept knowledge about emotions, and communication
skills, can transfer to their children. For instance, 2–4 year old
children’s total emotion utterances correlate with the emotion
labels that their mothers know and use (Cervantes and Callanan,
1998). Similarly, children whose mothers used more emotion
terms when children were 18 months old in turn produced more
emotion terms themselves at 24 months (Dunn et al., 1987).
Children whose parents discussed emotions more when chil-
dren were 36 months old also had better emotion understanding
at 6 years of age (Dunn et al., 1991). Parents’ explanations of
internal states and attributes (such as “hungry,” “sad,” or “nice”)
are thus thought to scaﬀold children’s own abilities to iden-
tify and describe the same experiences in themselves and others
(Saarni, 1999; Yehuda, 2005), perhaps because word use is help-
ing children acquire complex embodied information about a
given emotion category.
By contrast, parents who possess a paucity of conceptual
knowledge about emotion or who struggle to communicate
this knowledge likely dampen their children’s opportunities to
develop conceptual knowledge about emotion. Alexithymia is a
non-clinical characteristic commonly deﬁned as “diﬃculty iden-
tifying, understanding, and expressing feelings” (Bagby et al.,
1986) and is hypothesized to stem in part from a paucity in con-
ceptual knowledge about emotions (cf., Lindquist and Barrett,
2008b). In this view, adults with alexithymia either possess rel-
atively sparse knowledge about speciﬁc emotion concepts (e.g.,
knowledge about fear might consist of a relatively narrow pop-
ulation of instances) or do not have diﬀerentiated knowledge
about emotion concepts in the ﬁrst place (e.g., these individ-
uals do not possess diﬀerentiated concepts for anger, disgust,
and fear and instead just possess a concept for negativity). The
result is that they themselves have diﬃculty making situated con-
ceptualizations of aﬀective states in the moment, which in turn
limits their ability to translate this knowledge to their children.
Consistent with this interpretation, there is some evidence that
the tendency for alexithymia is transmitted across generations;
caregivers who struggle to communicate and express their feel-
ings create an impoverished environment for children to learn
conceptual knowledge about emotions (Berenbaum and James,
1994; Lumley et al., 1996). For instance, college students’ level of
alexithymia is positively correlated with their mothers’ retrospec-
tive diﬃculty expressing feelings when their children were young
(Fukunishi and Paris, 2001).
Similarly, evidence suggests that parents’ beliefs about emo-
tions, which can be considered a meta-cognitive aspect of emo-
tion concept knowledge, shape children’s emotional abilities.
Parents’ beliefs about the value of emotions guides both how par-
ents talk about emotions to children, but also how parents react
to their children’s emotions (Dunsmore and Halberstadt, 1997;
Hakim-Larson et al., 2006). For example, parents who believe
that emotions are valuable are more likely to discuss and teach
children about emotions (Gottman et al., 1996); this in turn
gives children an opportunity to discuss their growing conceptual
knowledge about diﬀerent emotions and get feedback on the sit-
uated conceptualizations they are making about their and others’
internal states and behaviors. Such exchanges consequently shape
children’s socioemotional abilities. For example, one recent study
found that parents’ beliefs that emotions are valuable as opposed
to dangerous predicted children’s ability to recognize their par-
ents’ emotional facial expressions (Castro et al., 2014). This may
be in part because parents who believe that emotions are danger-
ous are more likely to avoid expressing emotions, creating a more
impoverished aﬀective environment for their children to practice
their developing emotion-relevant skills (Dunsmore et al., 2009).
Another possibility, however, is that parents who avoid talking
about emotions to their children due to a belief that emotions are
dangerous do not help children acquire the conceptual knowl-
edge necessary for learning how to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent
emotional facial expressions.
Together, the developmental evidence suggests that parents
help children acquire emotion concepts, in part through the
communicative powers of language, and that parents also may
scaﬀold children through the process of making situated con-
ceptualizations of emotion. Parents constantly infer what they
believe their young child may be feeling—based on conceptu-
alizations of their own previous and current interoceptive and
exteroceptive experiences, in context of the current situation,
their knowledge of how their child usually acts, and how the
child is currently behaving. For instance, a father may catego-
rize his preverbal daughter’s internal state as “mad” when he
observes her refusing to eat and throwing her food—based on
the present context and also based on his knowledge of the
contexts in which he experiences frustration himself. He may
label her inferred state for her, asking why she is “mad”; this
parental labeling may in turn help the child associate her cur-
rent feelings of unpleasantness, her behaviors, and her father’s
reactions in that moment to the word “mad.” Over the course
of early childhood, parents (with varying degrees of skill) dis-
cuss with their children why the child behaved and felt the way
she/he did (“Why were you angry with Grandma?”) and why
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other people behaved and felt the way they did (“Your friend
hit you because he was angry you took his toy”). As children
acquire emotion concept knowledge and become able to label
their own states, they can receive feedback from adults on the
“accuracy” of their situated conceptualizations (e.g., the child
reports that she is “sad” because her brother took her toy and a
parent corrects that she is more likely to be “mad” that the toy was
taken). Over time, with the development of conceptual knowl-
edge and the ability to draw complex inferences about their own
and others’ mental states, children’s tendency to make situated
conceptualizations of emotion are likely to become more auto-
matic. Ultimately, children whose emotion knowledge is more
deﬁned (due to the content communicated by parents) and more
automatically accessible (due to motivation to categorize states
as emotional instilled by parents) would be more emotionally
aware and able to understand the complexities and nuance of
emotions in diﬀerent situations. The beneﬁt of this ability is
clear: childrenwho aremore skilled at recognizing and expressing
their own emotions exhibit less worry and depression than chil-
dren who struggle to convey their emotional experiences (Rieﬀe
et al., 2007). Likewise, children’s emotion understanding is pre-
dictive of their social and emotion regulation skills, as well as
their academic outcomes (for reviews, see Halberstadt et al., 2001,
2013).
Thus far, we have discussed concept acquisition as if it halts
after early childhood and remains stable thereafter. To the con-
trary, ﬁndings in adults suggest that language may still play a
role in adult emotion because language continues to help adults
acquire and use concept knowledge to make meaning of core
aﬀect and exteroceptive sensations. In fact, a small body of evi-
dence suggests that words help adults learn that novel perceptual
instances are either similar or distinct and assists adults in contin-
uing to assimilate new perceptual instances into existing category
knowledge. We now turn to this evidence.
Language and the Acquisition of Concept
Knowledge in Adults
In an embodied account of concept knowledge, adults continue
to update and reﬁne categories based on on-going experiences
of the perceptual world throughout their life (Schyns et al.,
1998; Vigliocco et al., 2009; Barsalou, 2012). Growing evidence
suggests that words play as much, if not more, of a role in
adults’ acquisition of novel visual categories, even when words
are redundant with other cues for learning. For instance, in
one study documenting the role of language in adult category
learning (Lupyan et al., 2007), participants learned to catego-
rize novel “alien” stimuli as things to be approached or things
to be avoided and received feedback on the accuracy of each
response. As participants received feedback about the accuracy
of their judgment, participants in the label condition also saw
a nonsense word; participants in the control condition received
no word. Even though words were not necessary for the task,
those participants who saw nonsense words while learning to
categorize the stimuli were later better able to diﬀerentiate
between members of diﬀerent categories than were individuals
who did not. Redundant words facilitated learning regardless of
whether they were presented visually or played aurally during
learning.
Despite research on the role of words in general adult con-
cept acquisition, very little work has speciﬁcally assessed how
words help adults learn novel emotion concepts. Indeed, it is hard
to conduct this research because most healthy adults (who are
not alexithymic) already possess substantial knowledge about the
feelings, situations, behaviors, and bodily changes that accom-
pany the emotion categories encoded by their acquired language.
However, one study addressed the role of language in the per-
ception of emotion in a category-learning task involving novel
Chimpanzee aﬀective facial actions that were unfamiliar to most
participants (Fugate et al., 2010). In the ﬁrst phase of the exper-
iment adults simply viewed pictures of unfamiliar Chimpanzee
facial actions (e.g., a “bared teeth” or “scream” face) or viewed
the faces while learning to associate them with nonsense words.
Participants were later shown two images taken from a contin-
uous morphed array of two facial expressions (e.g., an image of
a face containing a percentage of both the bared teeth expres-
sion and scream expression) and were asked to indicate whether
two faces from random points throughout the array were sim-
ilar to one another or diﬀerent. This was a classic measure of
“categorical perception” (Goldstone, 1994), the ability to perceive
categories within a continuous dimension of sensory informa-
tion. On some trials, participants compared faces that did not
cross one of the learned category boundaries (e.g., they compared
an 86% bared teeth, 14% scream expression with a 71% bared
teeth, 29% scream expression), whereas on others, they compared
faces that did cross a learned category boundary (e.g., compared a
43% bared teeth, 57% scream expression with a 29% bared teeth,
71% scream expression). If participants demonstrated categorical
perception, they would see the ﬁrst set of faces as similar but the
second set of faces as diﬀerent. Yet only participants who learned
to associate the faces with words in the ﬁrst phase of the experi-
ment demonstrated such categorical perception. Participants who
did not learn to associate faces with a label did not perceive a
categorical distinction between the faces.
Building on these ﬁndings, a recent study from our laboratory
suggests that language can even help adults acquire and assim-
ilate new perceptual experiences into existing category knowl-
edge about emotional facial expressions (Doyle and Lindquist, in
preparation). During a learning phase, participants saw a series of
non-stereotypical posed facial expressions of anger (e.g., a scowl
and squinted eyes with raised eyebrows) and fear (e.g., an open
mouth and wide eyes with furrowed eyebrows). In one between-
subjects condition, participants learned to associate these facial
expressions with emotion words (“anger” vs. “fear”). In another,
participants studied the faces and performed perceptual judg-
ments (whether the eyes were close together vs. far apart). In
a target phase, participants next studied target individuals who
were depicting stereotypical facial actions for either anger or fear
and were asked to categorize the facial expression as “anger” or
“fear.” During a ﬁnal test phase, participants were asked to iden-
tify which face the target individual had been making during
the target phase (i.e., either the learned face, the target face, or
a morphed combination of the two). Consistent with the idea
that language helps adults acquire and assimilate new perceptual
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instances into existing category knowledge, participants who had
paired faces with words in the learning phase were more likely
to remember seeing a target face that was similar to the learned
category information. These ﬁndings suggest that language helps
acquire novel category knowledge that biases memory of later
novel faces.
Together, these early ﬁndings point to the idea that language
continues to help adults acquire novel category knowledge across
the lifespan and to update existing category knowledge. This may
be how adults continue to augment their existing category knowl-
edge about emotion and suggests that at any point in time, adults’
category knowledge about emotion may reﬂect the regularities
present in the local environment (e.g., one’s cultural, social, or
familial context). For example, if concept knowledge is always
being updated and changed, then an adult’s knowledge about say,
anger, may be impacted by the last time the person experienced
an instance of anger (e.g., at a spouse). This concept knowledge
may thus feed-forward to impact situated conceptualizations of
future instances of body states when with a spouse, potentiat-
ing the situated conceptualization of anger over, say, anxiety or
even other body states such as hunger (e.g., a person might con-
ceptualize her unpleasant feelings around dinner time as anger
toward her spouse as opposed to hunger for the impending meal).
Thus, the CAT predicts that language does more than just help
acquire concept knowledge. It further predicts that language sup-
ports the accessibility and use of existing concept knowledge
as humans make meaning of sensations in the body or world
during the construction of emotions. This prediction is consis-
tent with growing evidence from cognitive science that language,
once connected to certain perceptual representations that become
stored as conceptual knowledge, alters on-going adult percep-
tion by selecting certain sensations for conscious awareness while
suppressing other sensations from conscious awareness.
The “Label-Feedback Hypothesis”:
Language Supports the Use of
Concept Knowledge
As we stated earlier, in the ﬁeld of emotion, the CAT’s pre-
diction about the role of language in emotion are quite novel.
However, current evidence in cognitive science converges on
the idea that language shapes on-going conceptual processes in
adults more generally; these conceptual processes furthermore
shape the online processing of external sensations across modal-
ities. According to Lupyan’s (2012a) “label-feedback hypothesis,”
labels connected to concepts shape the conceptual information
that is brought to bear when making meaning of sensations in
the environment (see Figure 1 in Lupyan, 2012b). The label-
feedback hypothesis thus explains why language shapes on-going
perception (e.g., visual perception) and cognition (e.g., thought)
in adults (see Lupyan, 2012a,b,c) and why language can alter on-
going emotional experiences and perceptions too (for a review of
these ﬁndings see Lindquist and Gendron, 2013; Lindquist et al.,
in press b).
The label-feedback hypothesis suggests that the linguistic
and conceptual systems become functionally entwined over the
course of development such that activation of concepts in adults
tends to activate labels and vice versa (see Lupyan, 2012a). For
instance, after learning throughout childhood that scowls occur-
ring in speciﬁc contexts (e.g., after an insult) are called “anger,”
this knowledge would be brought online to make meaning of
future facial movements in situations involving insults. The acti-
vation of the label across new situations might further warp visual
sensations in a top–down manner, causing scowls made follow-
ing insults to appear more similar to memories of other scowls
made following insults than scowls made when contemplating a
colleague’s question. As Lupyan (2012a) points out, modulation
of perception by language can be up-regulated when words are
explicitly referenced during perception. By contrast, the modula-
tion of perception by language can be down-regulated when the
linguistic system is temporarily impaired via verbal interference
or other means.
As an example of the up-regulation of language shaping on-
going visual perception, a set of studies (Lupyan, 2008; Lupyan
and Spivey, 2010a,b) examined the role of verbal labels on partic-
ipants’ reaction times to identify visual objects. For instance, in
one visual identiﬁcation task, participants were asked to locate a
target object (a chair) in an array of non-target objects (tables).
At the start of each block, participants were given an example
of the stimulus that was the target. On half the trials, before the
array of images appeared, participants also received the verbal
instructions to “ﬁnd the category” or “ﬁnd the chair.” Despite the
fact that the word “chair” was redundant with existing instruc-
tions, participants were quicker to ﬁnd the target on these trials,
suggesting that labels can help direct attention to certain visual
sensations in the environment (Lupyan and Spivey, 2010b).
Importantly, labels appear to modulate sensations in a deep
manner by altering which sensations are selected for conscious
awareness in the ﬁrst place. For instance, in one study (Lupyan
and Spivey, 2010a) participants completed a task in which they
made an object presence vs. absence judgment to brieﬂy pre-
sented letters. When participants heard the letter name prior
to the judgment, they identiﬁed the presence of the letter with
greater sensitivity (i.e., judged that it was present when it was
in fact present and absent when it was in fact absent). By con-
trast, a visual cue of the to-be-presented letter did not increase
participants’ sensitivity to judge it was present during the trial.
In an extension of these ﬁndings, participants in a separate study
(Lupyan and Ward, 2013) were asked to indicate whether they
saw a stimulus presented to one eye during continuous ﬂash
suppression (CFS) or not. CFS takes advantage of the binocular
nature of vision by directing ﬂashing visual images to one eye and
a still image to the other eye. Participants consciously perceive
the ﬂashing stimulus because it is dynamic, but the static image
is generally suppressed from conscious experience. In Lupyan
and Ward’s (2013) study, participants who were presented with
valid vs. invalid labels for the object present during CFS actually
showed greater sensitivity to detect the presence of a suppressed
image.
“Label-feedback” thus explains the myriad ways in which
language impacts spatial cognition (Boroditsky, 2001), color per-
ception (Winawer et al., 2007), action perception (Stanﬁeld and
Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al., 2002) and not least, our own language
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and emotion ﬁndings across adult cognition (for reviews, see
Lindquist and Gendron, 2013; Lindquist et al., in press a,b). For
instance, in several of our studies, we have down-regulated the
label-feedback eﬀect on adult emotion perception by temporarily
decreasing participants’ access to the meaning of emotion words
via a process called semantic satiation (Lindquist et al., 2006;
Gendron et al., 2012). In semantic satiation, participants repeat
a word out loud 30 times until the meaning of the word becomes
temporarily inaccessible. Semantic satiation operates by tem-
porarily disconnecting the phonological form of the word with
its meaning (Tian and Huber, 2010). In one of our most recent
studies (Gendron et al., 2012), satiating relevant emotion words
prior to participants perceiving a face impaired that face’s abil-
ity to perceptually prime itself again later in the trial. Perceptual
priming is evidenced when seeing a stimulus once causes a per-
son to render faster judgments about the identical stimulus on
later presentations and is thought to be mediated by visual pro-
cessing occurring in the visual cortex of the brain (Grill-Spector,
2008). Speciﬁcally, participants repeated a relevant emotion word
(e.g., anger) or an irrelevant abstract concept (e.g., idea) out loud
30 times before seeing a facial expression (e.g., Identity 1 depict-
ing a scowl). Later in the trial, participants either saw the same
face again (e.g., Identity 1 depicting a scowl) or a face that dif-
fered in terms of emotion (e.g., Identity 1 depicting a frown),
identity (e.g., Identity 2 depicting a scowl), or both (e.g., Identity
2 depicting a frown). We measured perceptual priming as par-
ticipants’ speed to render an arbitrary perceptual judgment (i.e.
how close or far apart the eyes of the face were) about the second
face presented on critical trials when perceptual priming should
occur (e.g., when Identity 1 scowls were followed by Identity 1
scowls). We hypothesized that if emotion concepts are routinely
involved in emotion perception, then disrupting access to emo-
tion concepts ought to interfere with how an emotional face is
perceived, which would in turn impair its ability to perceptu-
ally prime itself later in the trial. Consistent with this hypothesis,
semantic satiation interfered with the ability of the ﬁrst face to
facilitate judgments made about the subsequently presented face,
even though the task involved making an arbitrary perceptual
judgment that did not itself require access to emotion concepts.
Importantly, our ﬁndings were not due to fatigue because sati-
ating an irrelevant word (e.g., “idea”) did not similarly impair a
face’s ability to perceptually prime itself later in the trial (Gendron
et al., 2012).
Together, these ﬁndings suggest that language may not only
shape emotion by ultimately helping people acquire knowledge
about emotion across development, but language might also
more proximally shape emotion by contributing to the ability to
make situated conceptualizations of emotion in the moment.
Implications for the Role of Language
in the Acquisition and Use of Emotion
The implications of the role of language in emotion concept
acquisition and utilization are vast. In applied arenas, investi-
gations of how infants and children develop emotion knowl-
edge via words could inform interventions for individuals with
developmental disorders or maladaptive emotions. Recent evi-
dence suggests that the emotion perception deﬁcits observed in
adults with autism are mediated by alexithymic traits (Cook et al.,
2013), suggesting an important relationship between autism and
emotion concept knowledge. Teaching children to pair their bod-
ily sensations or the facial expressions made by others with words
early in life might therefore have a protective eﬀect on children at
risk of autism. Such interventions could even be used for infants
of alexithymic parents, who are at greater risk of becoming alex-
ithymic themselves and experiencing the associated decrements
in health and well-being (Berenbaum and James, 1994; Lumley
et al., 1996).
Children with language disorder diagnoses also face emotional
diﬃculties, underscoring the import role of language in emotion.
In particular, language impairments seem to impact children’s
ability to diﬀerentiate between emotions. One study suggested
that children with language impairments lack the full range of
diﬀerentiated positive and negative emotions, and instead simply
diﬀerentiate their internal states in global terms such as “good”
or “bad” (Fujiki et al., 2002). These same children, lacking the
emotion diﬀerentiation that language enables, also had trou-
ble identifying internal and external cues that would help them
regulate their aﬀective states. These ﬁndings are ultimately con-
sistent with evidence that learning speciﬁc emotion words (e.g.,
fear, anger, sadness, disgust) helps normally developing children
make more diﬀerentiated, nuanced situated conceptualizations of
other’s aﬀective states. Prior to learning speciﬁc emotion words
around ages 2–3, normally developing children only seem to
understand aﬀective valence (happy vs. sad; Russell and Widen,
2002; Widen and Russell, 2008). Thus, language may help turn a
child’s feelings of global “badness” into the diﬀerentiated negative
emotions that his or her culture’s linguistic structures represent.
For example, alexithymic children may be able to perceive and
label core aﬀective states in their bodies such as “bad” and “good,”
“hurt” and “nice” (which may explain why alexithymic individ-
uals tend to exhibit more somatization disorders: Gulec et al.,
2013; Zunhammer et al., 2013; Gulpek et al., 2014; Tominaga
et al., 2014), but are unable to diﬀerentiate that aﬀect into dis-
crete emotion categories via emotion construction (see Lindquist
and Barrett, 2008b for a discussion).
Beyond developing interventions for at-risk children, educa-
tional tools encouraging children to label their own and others’
emotions might oﬀer individuals skills that contribute to greater
social and emotional well-being. Although young children begin
to be able to pair words and emotional expressions across the
ﬁrst several years of life, they might beneﬁt from learning to do
this earlier on in childhood. As aforementioned, children who
know diﬀerent discrete emotion words (e.g., “anger” vs. “fear”
vs. “sadness”) can correspondingly diﬀerentiate between facial
expressions of those emotions, and children with parents who
label emotions are better at labeling their own emotions even
by 36 months of age. Finding practical ways to increase parents’
skill at discussing the bodily, situational, and behavioral aspects
of emotions with their children would likely prove beneﬁcial.
Classrooms and daycares that routinely ask young children to
pair words with facial expressions or to describe the situational
and interoceptive features of their feelings may thus produce
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more emotionally intelligent children who exhibit less worry and
depression (Rieﬀe et al., 2007) and who have superior social
and academic outcomes both in the moment and later in life
(for reviews see Halberstadt et al., 2001, 2013). Indeed, a recent
meta-analysis (Durlak et al., 2011) indicates that children who
go through emotion training techniques exhibit an 11-percentile
point increase in achievement on grades and standardized test
scores and exhibit more prosocial behavior and less emotional
distress in daily life.
Language-based emotion interventions might not just apply
to children. It is argued that adults with alexithymia have diﬃ-
culty making situated conceptualizations of their on-going aﬀec-
tive states and of others’ facial muscle movements (Lindquist
and Barrett, 2008a). If language plays a role in emotion, then
one means of treating such individuals would be to have them
engage in word-emotion matching tasks. Such tasks could be used
in therapists’ oﬃces, in the workplace, or implemented online.
We recently found that alexithymic adults have more diﬃculty
matching an emotional face (e.g., an angry face) with another
emotional face (e.g., another angry face) than do non-alexithymic
adults. Yet alexithymic adults are as quick and sensitive as non-
alexithymic individuals when asked to pair a face with a word
(Nook et al., in press). These ﬁndings suggest that alexithymic
individuals may not automatically access words to help make
situated conceptualizations of facial expressions, but that when
words are provided for them, they can indeed engage in a situated
conceptualization of emotion.
The construct of alexithymia has been correlated with a host
of psychopathologies (Bagby et al., 1986), and in particular som-
atization disorders (see Gucht and Heiser, 2003 for review; for a
recent review of alexithymia in depression and anxiety, see De
Berardis et al., 2008; for a recent review of alexithymia in eat-
ing disorders, see Nowakowski et al., 2013; for a recent review
and meta-analyses of alexithymia’s connection with schizophre-
nia, see O’Driscoll et al., 2014; for other recent empirical work
on alexithymia’s connection to personality disorders, see Nicolo
et al., 2011; Loas et al., 2012); thus, language-based emotion
interventions in adults may have clinical relevance to multiple
forms of psychopathology. For example, depression and anxi-
ety are both associated with diﬃculty identifying feelings, while
anxiety is speciﬁcally associated with diﬃculty describing feel-
ings (Korkoliakou et al., 2014). Similarly, a recent study on
borderline personality disorder (BPD) found that individuals
with BPD reacted to empathy inductions with greater personal
(rather than empathic) distress and greater diﬃculty labeling
their aﬀective reactions (New et al., 2012). Demiralp et al.
(2012) found that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder
had less diﬀerentiated negative emotion experiences compared
with healthy individuals. Our model would suggest that the poor
negative emotion diﬀerentiation observed in individuals with
Major Depressive Disorder may be in part driven by a paucity
of conceptual knowledge, which would make it more diﬃcult
for individuals to understand and ultimately regulate their neg-
ative feelings. Indeed, greater diﬀerentiation of one’s emotional
states is associated with better emotion regulation (Barrett et al.,
2001). Better emotion diﬀerentiation may also serve as a pro-
tective factor against destructive emotion regulation strategies
such as non-suicidal self-injury, as a recent daily diary study
of individuals with BPD found (Zaki et al., 2013). Although
some research suggests that language (in the form of journal-
ing, for example) can dampen or distance the eﬀects of negative
emotions (Pennebaker and Beall, 1986; Wilson and Schooler,
1991; Pennebaker, 1997; Hemenover, 2003), other work suggests
that language can also increase the discreteness of an emo-
tion experience, making it easier to regulate (Lieberman et al.,
2007; Kassam and Mendes, 2013; Burklund et al., 2014). This
literature supports our predictions that when language for emo-
tion concepts is both present and accessible, emotions are con-
structed as more distinctive and discrete experiences. We suggest
that interventions targeted at increasing individuals’ conceptual
knowledge and tendency to make situated conceptualizations
of emotions (for example, developing a more nuanced under-
standing of the bodily, behavioral, and situational dimensions
of emotions and using that information to help identify which
emotion one is feeling) may particularly help individuals who are
struggling with high emotional lability and mood dysregulation.
We suggest that increased emotion diﬀerentiation, supported by
improved conceptual and linguistic resources regarding emo-
tion, will increase individuals’ ability to identify and articulate
what they are feeling in a way that promotes eﬀective emotion
regulation.
Findings suggest that language may also help bilingual or
multilingual individuals implicitly regulate their emotions. For
instance, it has been argued that because some languages
denote diﬀerences between emotion categories that others do
not (e.g., Vietnamese speakers conceive of shame v. anguish
as distinct, whereas English speakers does not; Alvarado and
Jameson, 2010), this may promote greater emotion diﬀeren-
tiation and thus, greater emotion regulation, when speakers
are thinking in this language (for a review see Pavlenko,
2014). Bilingualism might also support emotion regulation by
implicitly producing emotional distance when an individual is
speaking in their non-dominant language. “Distancing” is an
emotion regulation strategy that involves deliberately assum-
ing a detached perspective on the emotional situation (Beck,
1970; Kross and Ayduk, 2011; Kross et al., 2014). A num-
ber of studies suggest that multilingual speakers experience less
emotional reactivity (measured as skin conductance responses,
self-ratings) when presented with words or phrases or when
asked to recall events in their non-native language (for a
review see Pavlenko, 2014). A second language might there-
fore implicitly “distance” individuals from the aﬀective value
of past and/or present events. However, whether a ﬁrst or
second (or third, etc.) language is likely to serve a distanc-
ing function depends on whether that language is a person’s
dominant and most frequently used language. In cases in
which individuals report that their second language is their
dominant and preferred language, those individuals tend to
have greater reactivity toward aﬀective words in their sec-
ond, as compared to their ﬁrst language (Degner et al., 2012;
Simcox et al., 2012).
In addition to important applied implications of a language-
emotion link, there are vast theoretical implications for the role
of language in emotion. Not least of which, is the implication
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that emotions are constructed via more basic elements rather
than physical types that are only named by words (Barrett, 2006b;
Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist et al., in press b). More broadly, the
role of language in emotion opens avenues for understanding
the cultural relativity of emotions. Previous work on the “taxon-
omy” of emotions relied on English emotion terms to deﬁne the
emotions that exist (for example, Shaver et al., 1987; Zinck and
Newen, 2007). In reality, we believe that these types of measures
catalog conceptual knowledge about emotion categories, and in
most cases, English emotion conceptual knowledge in particu-
lar. However, as Wierzbicka and others have argued, mapping
human experience solely based on English language terms fails to
understand the highly variable nature of emotion across cultures
(Wierzbicka, 2009).
The CAT recognizes the power of language in emotion and
instead predicts that the precise emotions experienced by a given
person in a given culture will depend on the emotion concepts
available to that person. Instead of hypothesizing that basic emo-
tion categories are given by speciﬁc structures in the brain, the
CAT envisions emotion terms such as “happiness,” “sadness,”
“fear,” “disgust,” and “anger” as abstract concepts that become
“essence placeholders” for distributions of conceptual knowledge
about embodied mental states. Such conceptual knowledge feeds
forward in a given instance of experience to help predict the
meaning of bodily sensations in a given context. The brain infers
that the current subjective state most closely matches a cer-
tain population of instances characterized as, e.g., “sadness” (in
English) or perhaps an entirely diﬀerent population of instances
in another language. Critically, since diﬀerent languages pro-
vide diﬀerent morphological placeholders for distributions of
embodied knowledge, this could cause individuals to segment
and experience their momentary bodily states in either subtly
diﬀerent or even quite distinct ways. Recognizing the role of lan-
guage in emotion may thus help scientists better measure and
document the individual diﬀerences and cultural relativity under-
lying emotion categories in a way that can plot new directions for
the study of emotion. We look forward to future directions in
language-emotion research that will assess the ways in which lan-
guage acquisition and utilization shape how humans experience
the emotional world across the lifespan.
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